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agreement with Tooley over animals having immaterial minds [p. 223].)
Plantinga dismisses Tooley’s arguments here as “the sheerest phantasmagoria;” Tooley may as well claim that “my new and very complex high
definition television has beliefs” (p. 234). And what about the content of
beliefs? Why this belief (say, “I am being appeared to greenly”) rather than
that belief (“I really hate that color”—or “I wish I were in Dixie,” for that
matter)? Tooley, Plantinga claims, isn’t arguing; he’s just positing.
Plantinga then questions Tooley’s reply to the evolutionary argument
against naturalism. Plantinga insists that Tooley just hasn’t given any reason to think our beliefs are true or why one form of belief-content rather
than any other should supervene upon our neural structures. Why think
the belief-content must be true?
In chapter 6, Tooley replies to Plantinga’s discussion of God’s probability
by claiming that beliefs admit of degrees. So Tooley wonders whether one
can rightly be called agnostic if he believes that God’s improbability is
0.75 or 0.95. And Tooley sees no reason to prefer a good God over an evil
one. Applying this to evil, Tooley wonders what is meant by rightmaking/
wrongmaking properties if they (seemingly) do not apply to God.
Tooley then offers further challenges to Plantinga’s externalist account
of justification, followed by questions about the incompatibilities in the
various religions, leading Tooley to wonder whether, for instance, there
is an inbuilt sensus divinitatis and whether religious beliefs are likely to be
true. When it comes to evil, Tooley thinks evil presents a defeater to theistic
belief since a person’s character “consists of the actions he or she performs
and intentionally refrains from performing” (p. 245). Tooley concludes by
stating that he does not find any inferential arguments for God’s existence
to be persuasive, though he breezes by the ontological argument, simply
appealing to Gaunilo’s counterargument without explanation.
In my estimation, the book is an excellent point-counterpoint text. I
highly recommend it for a graduate text in philosophy of religion.

Obstacles to Divine Revelation: God and the Reorientation of Human Reason, by
Rolfe King. London and New York: Continuum, 2008. Pp. x + 281. $130 (cloth).
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee
In this interesting if occasionally problematic book, King argues that while
a good and all powerful God would want to reveal himself to us so that he
can establish loving relations with us, there are obstacles to his doing so,
i.e., “feature[s] of the created order that may either block or hinder a form
of divine disclosure, or [have] in some way to be overcome in order for
God to disclose himself” (p. 5). Obstacles are a consequence of human limitations: “it is a logically necessary truth that because creatures are limited,
the number of ways in which” the God of traditional theism “can reveal
himself to them is limited” (p. 54). There is, in other words, a “necessary
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structure of revelation . . . within which, if there is a God, God necessarily
must operate if God is to give revelation to us” (p. 2).
For example, the limits imposed by this structure foreclose the possibility of “major revelation,” i.e., one “intended to affect the vast majority
of people across the globe at the time of the revelation” (p. 123). Such a
revelation would require an act of power that would obscure God’s love
and therefore make it difficult to secure our trust. (“If you come into my
house brandishing blazing fireworks, I would certainly know you existed,
but it would greatly increase my doubts about your character. Your apparent lack of meekness, and your overbearing power might make it very
difficult for me to trust you” [p. 124].)1
God is thus limited to “discrete revelation,” i.e., to giving “evidence to
just a few people at first, and then to progressively build up a large number
of people who trust in” him (pp. 128–129). King believes that there are a
limited number of ways God can do this. Among them are giving “a sense
of (localized) presence” or a “vision of glory” (e.g., the Transfiguration),
sending a “representative,” “internal communication (including dreams,
visions, impressions, etc.),” fulfilled prophecies, Resurrection, Incarnation,
and “acts of power to accompany [divine] communication” (p. 174).
This approach gives us virtual certainty as to what to look for. We know
with certainty that if there is a God who wishes to reveal himself, he must
employ items from the above list. “In addition, if (as seems certain . . .)
more than one of these types [of sign] will be necessary to achieve revelation . . . , we can be certain that there will be more than one of these
types used. Furthermore, on the assumption that God is perfect and will
therefore act with perfect wisdom . . . , it is also virtually certain” that he
will use “a good many of the . . . revelatory types” since doing so will
increase the likelihood that many men and women will respond to his
self-disclosure (p. 184).
King believes that the concept of divine plans is crucial for understanding what evidence we should look for to establish the existence and activity
of a God who wishes “to win human trust. . . . What our minds must do”
(normally implicitly) “is match our picture of God to some notion of a coherent divine plan” which yields “a picture” of the actions that flow from
it and of what we would be likely to observe if those actions were to occur.
Only when what we actually observe matches those conditional expectations do we have “a sufficient basis for trust in God” (p. 178).
King is thus a kind of evidentialist, although his evidentialism differs
from that of a Locke or a Swinburne. Rather than demanding that we know
that we know that y is the case because we have good evidence for it, “I
think it clearer to talk in terms of having knowledge that it is rational to
trust that we know that y is the case” (p. 118). “Trust knowledge” that y is
1
A second (and more interesting though less convincing) reason is that a major revelation
would be so “psychologically disruptive” for so many people that God would be “committed to eschatological revelation very shortly after,” which might conflict with other divine
goals such as a desire for future generations (132–134).
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the case occurs when (i) we believe that y is the case, (ii) y is the case, (iii)
our belief that y is the case is appropriately connected with y’s being the case
(typically by being causally grounded in it), and (iv) our trust in the source
which has provided the information that y is the case “is justified, in that it
is evidentially based (whether consciously or not) in line with” our “coherence rationality,” i.e., “consistent, or coherent, with” our “core desires and
goals and existing beliefs” (p. 119). The source of the relevant information
may be one’s “cognitive faculties, or a thing, or person or God,” or some
combination of the three (p. 118). Since the concept of trust knowledge is
quite general, it applies to testimony as well as to sense perception, memory, or rational intuition.
But while a (wholesale) rejection of the deliverances of our “sensory
faculties,” say, is “overwhelmingly against our coherence rationality,” a
rejection of divine testimony is not. We are wired to be profoundly disposed “to accept the initial deliverances of our sensory faculties,” and “it
is wholly rational to do this because . . . all of our desires and goals would
be subverted if we did not” (p. 119). Divine testimony, on the other hand,
is different in three ways. First, trust in divine testimony is not irresistible.
It can be rejected without subverting all of our desires, goals, and projects.
Second, there are real, and not merely sophisticated philosophical, reasons for doubting it. Finally, decisions to trust testimony should be guided
by a reflection on the costs and benefits of doing so. “Perhaps nearly all of
us would accept the testimony of the clerk in the railway station regarding
the official timetable. But once the truth or falsity of the information has
potentially very significant benefits or costs for us, we rationally (in terms
of our desires, goals, etc., . . . ) will set a higher level of required evidence. . . .
With sensory perception there is a massive cost in not trusting; with (apparent) divine testimony there may be, but so too there may be significant
costs of accepting the claims of divine testimony in terms of personal lifestyle changes” (pp. 119–120).
Note, however, that a belief can be coherently rational for one person
and not for another. “Different people might be presented with the same
set of statistics of market research, accounts and business plans,” and yet
“make different decisions” because of differences in their “desires, goals
and attitudes to risk, and so on.” One judges that the evidence is sufficient
to warrant engaging in the business venture in question and the other that
it is insufficient, but each person’s judgment is rational in the light of his or
her subjective set of desires, goals, and beliefs (pp. 205–206).
“Ideal rationality,” on the other hand, is defined as acting consistently or
coherently with the beliefs, attitudes and desires one ought to have in the light
of an objectively determined “ideal human character and destiny” (which,
for Christians, includes “human moral perfection and love for God, . . . and a
life beyond this one in the presence of God” as well as “a new created order
in which to live”) (pp. 210, 207). The discrepancies between coherence and
ideal rationality have consequences for the “maximum [possible] pace of
revelation.” A person’s sense of self is inextricably tied up with his or her
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beliefs, desires, and goals. The “self must change to be reoriented more and
more fully towards God if we are creatures whom God has made for deep
union with him.” Such changes “cannot go too far against our existing beliefs, desires, and goals” at any given moment, however, without creating “a
level of [cognitive and emotional] dissonance that would threaten the unity
of the self” (pp. 115–116). It follows that the appropriate religious epistemology for beings like us must be what King calls “journey-epistemology.”
“Religious discipleship generally seems akin to choosing and following
a guide or teacher.” Choosing and following a guide involves three beliefs:
“that one’s teacher or guide has really been to the place one wants to go,”
that one’s “guide’s self-testimony to that effect is truthful; . . . [and] that the
guide is the best person to lead one there. . . . What is needed,” therefore,
“is to have sufficient evidence on which to base one’s trust in the guide or
the leader. . . . But the level of that evidence will be partly determined by
[the degree of] our suspicion regarding the self-testimony of the one calling
us,” “partly by our desire, or lack of desire, to find . . . the place they tell
us about,” and partly by the potential costs of the journey (pp. 201–203).
The initial step requires an act of explicit trust. By contrast, “implicit faith”
(trust which “seems to just [spontaneously] arise within one” without having been consciously based on evidence” [p. 121]) is an essential feature of
any healthy interpersonal relationship, and “grows as the character (and
ability) of the testifier is increasingly trusted.” It “may, of course, recede on
journeys if things don’t seem to turn out” as had one anticipated and, in
that case, an act of explicit trust may again be needed (p. 230). In either case,
though, one’s journey may be blocked or retarded if, when acts of explicit
trust are called for, one’s emotions, desires, and goals are too far out of line
with the response called for by ideal rationality in that situation.
I will close by addressing two questions raised by King’s argument.
First, does his epistemological model work for instances of direct cognition? Is it, too, evidence based? If not, and direct cognition of the divine
is possible, then God could reveal himself to us without our needing supporting evidence.
King argues that models of direct perception such as those of Alvin
Plantinga and William Alston do not evade the need for evidence. For in
the first place, they presuppose that relevant background information is in
place. I can’t recognize (and hence perceive) that what I sense is snow, for
example, without having learned that the sensory “pattern” I see is what
we call “snow.” “I must,” in other words, “have matched the pattern I see
with some kind of existing inner background information that” instances
of that pattern are snow. “Direct” cognition thus, in fact, involves “unconscious, implicit” evidential reasoning (p. 85).
In the second, “direct” cognition of divine things is a form of divine
testimony and (as we have seen) it is reasonable to rely on testimony only
when “one has good evidential grounds to trust the testifier” (p. 77). Finally, the necessity of evidence increases when there are reasons for doubt
(e.g., a conflict of witnesses, or evidence suggesting that what the testifier
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says is false) and the costs and benefits of believing are significant. Both
conditions are met in the case of alleged experiences of God. (King allows
that given that the appropriate background is in place, and that we are
justified in believing that the source of our belief that p is reliable, we need
no further evidence to be justified in believing that p, and that our belief is,
in that sense, “a form of instant or immediate” knowledge [p. 79]. He insists,
however, that it is nonetheless evidentially based.)
One can quarrel with the details of King’s analysis. For example, that
perception (as distinguished from mere sensing) can only occur when the
appropriate background is in place does not entail that one implicitly or explicitly reasons from one’s sensum and the relevant background information
to the belief that a pig, say, is in front of one. Again, it is surely reasonable for
a very small child to trust what others tell her in spite of the fact that she initially has no “evidential grounds” for regarding them as reliable. Or again,
that one needs evidence to be justified in retaining one’s belief doesn’t entail
that one’s belief rests on evidence. (For one thing, the evidence required to
justifiably retain one’s belief often doesn’t support the belief itself but, rather,
the claim that one or another defeater of that belief is inconclusive.)
Nevertheless, King’s central point seems to me well taken. Where evidence is construed sufficiently broadly (to include inner experience or
feelings or intuitions, for example, as well as “public” evidence), one is
aware of grounds for doubting the truth or accuracy of the information
provided by one’s source, and one recognizes that the stakes of believing
are significant, a search for evidence that the source of that information
is reliable is order. I suspect that for most informed and reflective adults
in our culture, there are few if any significant epistemological differences
between those who claim that their religious belief rests on evidence and
those who deny that their belief rests on evidence but concede evidence is
needed to justify its retention. For pretty much the same kind of evidence
is normally crucial for both.
Second, King thinks that “special revelation” rests on divine “selfidentification” (pp. 84–85). For “consider any divine activity, D, [such as
giving a “sense of (localized) presence,” or vouchsafing a dream or vision,
or “performing an act of power to accompany communication” (p. 174)]
which is intended by God to form part of the evidence for a specific revelation. How could we know that D was even part of possible evidence for
God unless God has self-testified in some form that D is actually due to
him, or at least previously given sufficient self-testimony about events like
D to enable us to recognize that D itself is brought about by God” (p. 195)?
This leads to a dilemma, however. For attempts to apply either of the
two most popular takes on the logic of testimony lead to difficulties. “Reductionists” claim that testimonial evidence “reduces to other forms of evidence or knowledge.” Where “X testifies that y is the case, . . . A is entitled
to believe that y” is the case only if A has independent (of X’s testimony)
reason for believing that X’s testimony is reliable or that y is the case. God,
however, “cannot give independent evidence, that is, evidence independent
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of divine self-testimony. For all [the] evidence that God can give must be
accompanied . . . ([although] not necessarily at the same time) by divine
self-testimony” (pp. 195–196).
Non-reductionists,” on the other hand, “affirm that if X testifies that y
is the case, then. . . . A is entitled to believe that y simply on X’s testimony
. . . provided that A knows of no defeaters” (such as reasons for thinking
that X is unreliable or that y isn’t the case). Yet this, too, won’t do, since
it is unreasonable to rely on the unsupported word of someone whose
reliability is also unsupported when the stakes are significant and there
is “considerable . . . personal risk.” Since accepting God’s testimony “is
likely to involve some significant alterations in life style” that will “impact” not only ourselves but our families and friends, “it appears that the
non-reductionist account will not apply here” either. (pp. 195–196)
King believes “there is a way out of this dilemma,” however. For while
“God cannot give us evidence independent of his self-testimony, we may
be able to find such evidence.” And in fact we can. Since, true conditionals
like “If God exists and wishes to disclose himself to creatures like us, he
would adopt one or more of the items on King’s list of modes of revelation” are necessarily true, “we can find [them] out independently of any
testimony given to us by God.” Even if all knowledge of God rests on divine self-testimony, it does not rest on divine testimony alone since it also
involves an implicit or explicit grasp of the “necessary structure of [any
possible] revelation” (p. 197).
There are problems with King’s account. For example, King sometimes
speaks of divine activities as “part” of the evidence for a “specific revelation.” Strictly speaking, though, the evidence isn’t God’s activity itself but
its product. One of God’s revelatory options, for instance, is to “give a sense
of [his] (localized) presence” (p. 174). Yet our evidence is the occurrence of
the sense of presence itself, not God’s act of causing it. This is a comparatively minor objection, however. Another problem is more serious.
Just why must all knowledge of God be based on God’s self-testimony?
The idea is presumably this: (1) To interpret any piece of evidence, e, as evidence of God is to interpret e as being intentionally caused by God to be a
sign of his presence. (2) To interpret e as being intentionally caused by God
to be a sign of his presence is to interpret the occurrence of e as an act of
divine self-testimony. (3) All evidence of God must therefore be regarded
as a form of divine self-testimony. Both (1) and (2) are suspect, however.
The generalization of which (1) is an instance, viz.,
(1') To interpret any piece of evidence, e, as evidence of a person, P, is
to interpret e as being intentionally caused by P to be a sign of P’s
presence,
is false. I can correctly interpret the footprints in my backyard as evidence
of Peter’s recent presence, for instance, without interpreting them as having been intentionally caused by Peter to be a sign of his presence. King
thus owes us an explanation of precisely what makes God’s case unique.
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(2) is also dubious. If e must be caused by E (in whole or in part) in order
to be evidence for E, then if e* is to be evidence for God, it must be caused
by God. If God exists, this condition is trivially met, since everything other
than God is wholly or partly caused by him. That it is met isn’t sufficient
to regard his production of e* as part of God’s self-testimony, however. For
it is also necessary that God intentionally caused e* to serve as a sign of his
presence. Suppose both conditions are met. Are they jointly sufficient? Not
clearly. For it isn’t clear that God’s intentionally initiating certain evolutionary processes which he knew would eventually lead us to form theistic
concepts, and to interpret certain feelings and patterns as evidence of his
existence, would count as self-testimony. The remoteness of God’s act in
the causal chain seems to count against it, in any case, since “God disclosed
himself in an occurrence or pattern of occurrences, O,” at least contextually
implies that God is an immediate, or at least not too remote, cause of O.

The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy, from Antiquity through the Seventeenth Century, edited by Steven Nadler and T. M. Rudavsky. Cambridge
University Press, 2009, Pp. 904. £ 100 (hardcover).
JEROME GELLMAN, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
This volume includes twenty-three articles covering six main topics in Jewish philosophy from antiquity to the seventeenth century. The topics are: (1)
Texts and Contents, (2) Logic and Language, (3) Natural Philosophy, (4) Epistemology and Psychology, (5) Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, and
(6) Practical Philosophy. The editors have added a splendid “Biobliographical
Appendix,” consisting of a brief bio on each philosopher discussed in the
volume plus a list of his central writings. The articles are uniformly outstanding and well deserve reading by Christian philosophers. The central character in this volume is, naturally, Maimonides (Aquinas’s “Rabbi Moses”),
with Philo appearing as the first Jewish “philosopher” and Spinoza
closing the story in the seventeenth century. It is to the great credit of the
editors that they included Spinoza in the pantheon of Jewish philosophers.
While Spinoza may not have written an explicitly “Jewish” philosophy, this
volume well establishes that his thought lies on a continuum with Jewish
philosophy up until his day. In addition, Spinoza’s writings include polemics, explicit and implicit, against previous Jewish philosophers, chiefly
Maimonides. Placing Spinoza within Jewish philosophy helps to understand
the break that took place in the seventeenth century between traditional and
modern Jewish philosophy and serves as a bridge to Moses Mendelssohn’s
distinctly modern Jewish thought in the eighteenth century.
When reading this volume on the history of Jewish philosophy, a Christian
philosopher should keep in mind three factors that make the Jewish philosophical output truly remarkable. First, the Jews were a minuscule minority

